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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter because this case has been
transferred from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2~2-(4) (1953, as
amended).

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
ISSUE I:

Did the District Court fail to give proper jury, specifically by not
presenting a lesser included offense?
(Raised below: See R. at 801, 803; Trial Transcript (Record pp.
1255-1258) (hereafter "Tr.") at 917.)

ISSUE II:

Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion for Mistrial
because comments by trial judge were improper and denied the Defendant
the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury?
(Raised below: See Tr. at 59-60.)

ISSUE III:

Did the Court err in not suppressing the suppress evidence from trunk of
an automobile in which the methamphetamine lab central to this case was
discovered based on defective third-party consent?
(Raised below: See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 (defense counsel
bringing out on cross-examination of searching officer, in hearing
on motion to suppress, that third parties, to whom the evidence in
the trunk did not belong, rather than the Defendant gave the
consent to search box in trunk), and p. 162 (counsel pointing out,
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inter alia, the box belonged to the Defendant and he had an
expectation of privacy in it, in making his argument the the
evidence found therein should be suppressed).
ISSUE IV:

Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress
evidence seized from the Purgatory Correctional Facility and from the St.
George impound lot?
(Raised below: R. at 12-13, 204, 1259)

ISSUE V:

Did the District Court err in denying the Defendant's Motion in Limine
and allowing eye witness testimony which was tainted and unreliable?
(See Tr. at 635.)
(Raised below: R. at 635-637).

ISSUE VI:

Did the District Court err in allowing a jail "kite" or letter (trial exhibit
#28) into evidence, where there was insufficient foundation to allow the
letter into evidence?
(Raised below: Transcript of Trial (R. 1257) at 491-493, 507.

ISSUE VII:

Did the District Court err in disallowing certain testimony from defense
witness Mr. Paul Halstead, on the basis of hearsay; and the testimony of
defense witness Mr. Troy Thode, on the basis of hearsay and on the basis
that it was too collateral to the issues at trial?
(Raised below: Tr. at 673-679; 752 to 753.)
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Standards of Review
The standard of review for Issue I:

Whether the trial court properly refused to

give requested instructions to a jury is a matter reviewed for correctness. State v. Parra, 972 P.2d
924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court formulated a two-part analysis for determining whether to grant
a defendant's request for jury instructions on a lesser included offense.
First, the court must compare the statutory elements of the crimes and
determine whether the elements overlap. See id. Second, it must
determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of
the alternative offense. See id.
State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
The standard of review for Issue II:

Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed

for abuse of discretion and this standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result for the defendant. For purposes of determining whether a mistrial should have been
granted, our overriding concern is that defendant receive a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d
262, 276 (Utah 1998).
The standard of review for Issue III and IV: "A trial court's findings underlying its
decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
and it's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness." State v. Jarman, 9987 P. 2d 1284.
The standard of review for Issue V, VI, and VII: Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for
abuse of discretion, although the application of legal standards in those rulings is reviewed for
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Wetzel 868 F. 2d 64 (Utah 1983); State v. Thurman. 846 F. 2d
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1256 (Utah 1993); Comcoa. Inc. v. Nee Tel's. Inc.. 931 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991); Orthv.
Emerson Elec. Co.. 980 F. 2d 632, (10th Cir. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a criminal action against Defendant for one count of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION
OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a first-degree felony under
U.C.A 58-37d-4 (1953, as amended).
B. Course of the Proceedings
Trial of the above-referenced matter was conducted on October 22, 2001 to October 25,
2001 on the instant charges. See Record Transcripts of Jury Trial, with each transcript volume
given record numbers, to wit: 1255, 1256, 1257, and 1258; the pagination of the Jury Trial
transcripts runs consecutively throughout the several volumes (hereafter jury trial transcripts will
be cited as "Tr." with page numbering from the consecutive pagination indicated thereafter). At
the Preliminary Hearing evidence was presented and the Defendant was bound over for trial. See
R. at 55-57, 60, 71. Trial by jury was then held on the above-mentioned dates.
C. Disposition at Trial Court
The Defendant was convicted at trial, and originally Judgment, according to the jury
verdict, was pronounced against Defendant and on December 3, 2001. R. at 854-55. Defendant
was sentenced by the trial court to a five-to-life prison term in the Utah State Prison. On
December 20, 2001, a signed Judgment, Commitment, and Sentence was entered. R. at 868-870.
On February 8, 2002, an amended judgment was entered, which stated that Defendant had been
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convicted of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and that the conviction
had been enhanced to a first-degree felony. R. at 955-958. On March 18, 2005, a Second
Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment was entered by the Court, which also sentenced
Defendant to a five-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. See Record at 1483-1486. A Notice of
Appeal was filed on March 22, 2005. R. at 1489-1488.
P. Statement of Facts
Facts Regarding Issue I:
The Defendant in this case submitted to the Court at trial, but the District Court
disallowed, the following proposed instruction ("Instruction No. A"), which set forth the
instructions as to what elements were necessary to convict Defendant on the charge of Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment and Supplies, also gave the jury the option of convicting
Defendant of a lesser included offense, that of Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a
class A misdemeanor; the trial judge refused to include this jury instruction. The proposed
instruction read as follows:
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER guilty
of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or
Supplies, a as charged in the Information, the State must prove and
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and
every one of the following elements:
1.
That the Defendant acted knowingly and intelligently;
2.
That the Defendant did:
(a)
possess laboratory equipment and supplies
with the intent to engage in a clandestine
methamphetamine laboratory operation; or
(b)
possess a controlled substance precursor with
the intent to engage in a clandestine
methamphetamine laboratory operation; and
3.
That such acts occurred on or about January 14,1999,
through January 21, 1999, in Iron County, State of
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Utah.
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the
previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty
of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or
Supplies, as charged in the Information. If the State has proved,
however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find
the Defendant guilty of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory
Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information.
In the event that you find the Defendant not guilty of Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, you should
disregard the balance of this Instruction and proceed to the next
numbered Jury Instruction which deals with Possession of a
Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor.
If you find that the Defendant is guilty of Unlawful Possession of
Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information,
then and only then should you consider whether or not said acts took
place under the following conditions, to wit:
(a)

(b)
(c)

The
Defendant
illegally possessed,
transported, or disposed of hazardous or
dangerous material while transporting, or
causing to be transported, materials in
furtherance of a clandestine laboratory
operation, that created a substantial risk to
human health or safety or danger to the
environment.
The intended methamphetamine laboratory operation
took place within 500 feet of a residence.
Said clandestine laboratory operation was for the
production of methamphetamine base.

If, [sic] you find the Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, and
you find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the
special conditions exist, then you should so indicate on the special
verdict form provided with these instructions.
R. at 803 (emphasis added).
Because the trial judge refused to include the lesser included offense language in the first
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instruction, he likewise did not include the following instruction ("Instruction No. B") on the
elements of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor:
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER guilty of the offense
of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor,
a lesser included charge of the one charged in the Information, the State must prove
and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one
of the following elements:
1.

That the Defendant acted knowingly and intelligently;

2.

That the Defendant did:
(a)
obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any
controlled substance precursor, and
(b)
the Defendant knew or had reasonable cause
to believe that the controlled substance
precursor was intended to be used in the
unlawful manufacture of any controlled
substance, and

3.

That such acts occurred on or about January 14,1999,
through January 21, 1999, in Iron County, State of
Utah.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the
previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty
of the offense of a Controlled Substance Precursor [sic].
If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A
misdemeanor.

R. at 801.
The reasoning behind the judge's refusal is preserved on the record. The trial judge, in
justifying his refusal, gave the following explanation:
The court, in analyzing the evidence and testimony that came before
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this jury, first of all, form the state's witnesses, the expert witnesses,
the chemist who analyzed the material seized from the trunk of the
blue Corsica, did not elicit, in any form, any weight of controlled
substance precursors. We had no weight of iodine crystals, no weight
of phosphorous of any kind, and no weight of ephedrine. The only
evidence of the presence of iodine crystals in an amount sufficient to
meet the 12-ounce statutory threshold under the statute, as it exists
now and as it existed back in 1999, was the evidence offered by Mr.
Messer himself indicating that the witness, Karen Hardy, displayed
to him a 1 gallon ziplock bag containing his, in his estimate, 2 pounds
of what he described as iodine crystals. That testimony was
independent and separate from any of the supporting testimony
whatsoever. The only logical inference that the court can have
regarding the source of iodine crystals for these parties is the
reduction by evaporation of tincture of iodine purchased
from Overson's Farm Supply and from Intermountain Farmers.
The testimony was clear, a total of five gallons, one from
Intermountain Farmers at maximum. And there was some conflict
there, may be none, from Intermountain Farmers, and four or five
from Overson's. Mr. Messer is the only person who testified that
there was five. Mr. Overson testified that that was a 7 percent
solution of tincture of iodine. A 1 gallon plastic bag containing
only the iodine from that many gallons of 7 percent solution would
not possibly have the volume described by Mr. Messer. And I have
no idea as to the weight because my chemistry is way too old to
remember the atomic weight of iodine or the potential weight of a
gallon of this tincture, therefore, I'm not giving it.

Tr. at 914.
Immediately after the judge's statement, the following interchange between Mr. Scarth,
counsel for Defendant, and the trial judge, took place:
MR. SCARTH:

The only thing is regards to your findings,
Your honor, is you stated that Mr. Messer's
testimony was that Karen Hardy displayed the
crystalline iodine to him. But his testimony
was in fact that he handled it.

THE COURT:

That's correct, counsel. He did testify that he
handled it. And feeling, that wonderful
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phrase that he did not use, but I will use, the
heft thereof, estimated it at 2 pounds, but
that's the only testimony that we have on the
issue.
Tr.at916.
Facts Regarding Issue II:
In his introductory comments to the jury, the Court stated:
Right now, our system of government, our way of life is under
assault. And it's good people like you who stand up and support it.
Tr. at 54.
Trial Counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied without explanation or
justification. See Tr. at 59-60.
Facts Regarding Issue III;
During the investigation into Defendant's purported methamphetamine lab, Officer Kelly
Edwards of the Cedar City Police Department went to the home of Tim Hasch because of
suspected illegal activity on Mr. Hasch's property (Tr. at 430). Also present at Mr. Hasch's home
with Officer Edwards were David Excell, Mark Gower, and J.R. Robinson, and Keith Millett, all
of whom are peace officers (Tr. at 372). Officer Edwards testified that he asked Mr. Hasch is he
could look at the contents inside a car on Mr. Hasch's property and Mr. Hasch gave consent to
the search (Tr. at 431). According to Officer Edward's Testimony, Mr. Hasch retrieved a key to
the car and opened up the car trunk where Officer Edwards testified to seeing a bag that he
suspected contained a methamphetamine lab (Tr. at 431). Officer Edwards testified that he
believed that the bag and purported methamphetamine lab did not belong to Mr. Hasch because
Mr. Hasch had in fact informed Officer Edwards that it was not his. Mr. Hasch also testified at
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trial that the meth lab in the trunk of the car was not his, that he had never used it, and had never
seen it before (Tr. at 438). Officer Millett testified that when the trunk of the car was opened he
saw two suitcases, a duffel bag, and a backpack (Tr. at 374). Officer Millet also testified that he
believed that Officer Excell photographed the "stuff in the trunk and then "opened it up briefly
just to see what it contained' (Tr. at 374, emphasis added).
Mr. Hasch was the one that gave the consent upon which the officers relied, for the search
of the contents of the trunk, even though Mr. Hasch made clear those items did not belong to him
and belonged instead to the Defendant. See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 There was no assertion that
the Defendant gave consent to the search of his private bags. See id., passim.
Facts Regarding Issue IV:
On January 21, 1999, Detective Mark Gower, Commander David Excell, and thenagent Keith Millett followed Defendant's vehicle southbound on Interstate 15 from Cedar
City to La Verkin, Utah (Tr. at 101). Detective Gower continued to follow Defendant's
vehicle southbound toward Hurricane, Utah and later observed Ms. Karen Hardy walking
with Defendant's car stopped a short distance away from Ms. Hardy's location.
Defendant was identified as the driver of the car and arrested. Defendant's vehicle was
impounded and subsequently inventoried. In speaking with Ms. Hardy, Detective Gower
learned that a "boxed" methamphetamine lab was being stored on the property of Tim
Hasch (Tr. 104-105). Later in the evening Detective Gower responded to the Hasch
residence and, with the assistance of Mr. Hasch, discovered the boxed lab in the trunk of
a car parked on Mr. Hasch's property. The key to open the trunk was provided by Mr.
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Hasch, who informed Detective Gower that Defendant possessed another key to the same
trunk (Tr. 105).
Detective Gower then returned to the Purgatory Correctional Facility in
Washington County, Utah, to examine the items taken from Defendant when he was
booked into jail (Tr. 106). Detective Gower located a key withing this property that later
opened the trunk of the vehicle containing the boxed lab (Tr. 107).
Upon further examination of the trunk, Detective Gower located two suitcases, a
duffle bag, and a backpack (Tr. 108). After conducting an inventory of the items located
within the suitcases and bags, Detective Gower notice these were items consistent with
clandestine manufacturing of methamphetamines (Tr. 111).
At a hearing held on August 23, 2001, the Court accepted the proffer of
Defendant's testimony as follows: (1) That at the Washington County Jail on January 21,
1999, after Defendant's booking inventory of his personal belongings was complete,
Defendant saw a man named Brett Rasmussen, who was an acquaintance of Defendant,
and requested the booking deputy to release Defendant's personal property to Mr.
Rasmussen. The deputy refused the request.(2) Thereafter, a detective examined
Defendant's personal property at the jail and seized certain items for evidentiary
purposes. (3) That on February 2, 1999, police officers went to the St. George Police
impound lot and, without a warrant, seized a walkie-talkie/two-way radio box from
Defendant's car. (Tr. 106-111)
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Facts Regarding Issue V:
The district court failed to limit Larry J. Overson's identification testimony at trial
(Tr. at 635).
At the preliminary hearing on this matter Mr. Overson identified Defendant as one
of the two persons who purchased iodine in his store on January 14, 1999 (Tr. 8-10).
However, Mr. Overson's identification of Defendant was not only assisted by
Defendant being seated at the defense counsel's table and attired in prison garb, but was
also prompted to give his identification by a leading question by the state prosecutor.
The prosecutor asked Mr. Overson the following question: "Is one of the individuals that
you saw on January 14th in your store seated at the table on my left?"
Therefore, as a result of the prosecutor essentially pointing out Defendant to the
witness for the purposes of identification, Mr. Overson's identification is forever tainted.
Mr. Overson could also not identify or recall seeing another person (Karen Hardy)
who had earlier been in the court room for the preliminary hearing, and who, in fact, had
been the person who actually purchased the iodine in question directly from Mr. Overson
(Tr.6, 11).
Facts Regarding Issue VI:
At trial the State introduced, with the Defense's objection being overruled, a jail "kite" or
letter purported to have been written by the Defendant, which contained incriminating statements
which the State utilized as evidence that Defendant was attempting to convey to a co-defendant
his encouragement that they stick together and not cut a deal with the State, and suggesting to the
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co-defendant that she get the key to the box holding the methamphetamine lab so, purportedly,
evidence could be taken and/or destroyed. See Trial Exhibit #28; R. at 983 p. 18-19.
The Defense objected for lack of foundation, and the Court overruled the objection. The
Court stated that the only foundation for the letter was the testimony of a co-defendant who
indicated she could recognize the handwriting as the Defendant's handwriting. See R. 1257, p.
520 (Court states: " . . . It is the identity of this, lay identification of that handwriting as Mr.
Messer's, which is the sole basis for the court's admission of it.").
Facts Regarding Issue VII:
The Defense sought at trial to have Mr. Paul Halstead, who had been a cell mate of
State's witness, Mr. Ervin Hasch, testify that Ervin Hasch, was attempting to pin the
methamphetamine lab on Mr. Messer rather than having to answer for it himself. See Tr. at 67576. The Court did not allow this testimony based on the determination that it was hearsay and on
the fact that the Defense did not reveal the Defense's intention to put on this hearsay testimony to
the State until a point during the trial. The Court determined it could not come in, due to this
lack of notice, and the Court cited Utah Rules of Evidence 803(24). Id.
The Defense also sought at trial to put on testimony from bail bondsman Troy Thode
regarding a woman he'd previously bailed out of jail, State's witness Karen Hardy. See Tr. at
748-756. The testimony in question, which was not allowed by the Court, was that Ms. Hardy
had been bailed out by him, and had secured the transaction with some jewelry and two vehicles;
and that the vehicles, when the bondsman went to tow them to hold them, were gone; and that the
jewelry turned out to be reportedly stolen from another State's witnesses' (Todd Farnsworth's)
house; and that she had jumped bail. See id. The Court did not allow this testimony, on the basis
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that it was "impeachment in a far too collateral issue." See id. at 752.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE I: The District Court failed to give proper jury instructions by not giving the jury
a choice of a lesser included offense. The jury should have been given the opportunity to convict
on the lesser included offense.
ISSUE II: The District Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for Mistrial because
comments by trial judge were improper and denied the Defendant the right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury. The comments made by the Court at the outset of the trial were inappropriate and
set a tone which was not impartial and in line with the presumption of innocence, but which
rather set a tone that the juror's duty was to convict.
ISSUE III: The Court erred in not suppressing evidence found in a trunk which was
searched based on invalid third-party consent. The items found in the trunk were identified by
the third party as not belonging to him, and yet law enforcement searched them based on the third
party's consent.
ISSUE IV: The District Court failed to suppress the illegally of obtained evidence by the
police seizure of Defendant's personal property without consent or a search warrant at the
Purgatory Jail after the booking inventory search was completed, violating the Defendant's U.S.
and Utah Constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The District Court
also failed to suppress the illegally obtained evidence by the police seizure of personal property
from the Defendant's car at the police impound lot some twelve (12) days after the impound and
inventory search again without consent or a search warrant, which violated the Defendant's U.S.
14

and Utah Constitutional protected rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE V: The District Court failed to limit Larry J. Oversons' identification testimony at
trial. During the preliminary hearing Mr. Oversons' identification of the Defendant was unduly
influences, and the objectivity thereof corrupted, not only by the Defendant being seated at
Defense Counsel's table an attired in prison garb, but further with the leading question of the
Prosecutor. The Prosecutor asked Mr. Oversons the following question, "Is one of the individuals
that you say on January 14th in your store seated at the table to my left?" Therefor, as a result to
the Prosecutor practically pointing to the Defendant, Mr. Oversons' identification of the
defendant is forever tainted. Therefore the admittance of the tainted witness testimony violated
the Defendant's U.S. and Utah Constitutional right to a fair trial.
ISSUE VI: The District Court erred in admitting a letter/kite (Trial Exhibit #28) into
evidence because there was insufficient foundation to allow the letter into evidence, which
violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial.
ISSUE VII: The District Court erred in disallowing the testimony of defense witness Mr.
Paul Haulstead on the basis of Hearsay, and the testimony of Mr. Troy Thode on the basis of it
being too collateral to the issues at trial. Both rulings denied the defendant due process and
violated his right to a fair trial.
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO GIVE PROPER JURY
INSTRUCTIONS BY NOT GIVING THE JURY A CHOICE OF A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.

Whether the trial court properly refused to give requested instructions to a jury is a matter
reviewed for correctness. State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court formulated a two-part analysis for determining whether to grant
a defendant's request for jury instructions on a lesser included offense.
First, the court must compare the statutory elements of the crimes and
determine whether the elements overlap. See id. Second, it must
determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of
the alternative offense. See id.
State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).7
The Court disallowed a lesser included jury instruction in this case, as wet forth in the
Statement of Facts above. Defendant's proposed instruction in this regard set forth the instructions
as to what elements were necessary to convict Defendant on the charge of Unlawful Possession of
Laboratory Equipment and Supplies, but also gave the jury the option of convicting Defendant of
a lesser included offense, that of Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A
misdemeanor; the trial judge refused to include this jury instruction.

1

See also U.S. v. Monger. 185 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (New trial granted
because district court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser offense of simple possession is
intrinsically harmful constitutional error); State v. Payne. 964 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-503; State v. Bluff. 52 P.3d 1210
(Utah 2002): State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991): State v. Smith. 706
P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985); State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).
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Because the trial judge refused to include the lesser included offense language in the first
instruction, he likewise did not include the Defendant's proposed instruction ("Instruction No. B")
on the elements of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A
misdemeanor.

See Statement of Facts above.

Applying the Baker test cited above to the reasoning of the Court, as set forth above in the
Statement of Facts, it is evident that the trial judge erred in refusing to give the jury the option of
convicting Defendant on the lesser included offense. In analyzing the two statutes at issue, U.C.A.
§58-37d-4 (1953, as amended) (Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies) and
U.C.A. §58-37c-10(k) (1953, as amended) (Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
Precursor), it is clear that the elements of the two crimes overlap. One of the two elements necessary
to convict a Defendant of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, and included
in the jury instructions as presented to the jury, is that the Defendant "possess a controlled substance
precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation." R. at
826.

The statute associated with the lesser included offense of Unlawful Possession of a

Controlled Substance Precursor reads defines unlawful conducts as
obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled
substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance
precursor or any combination of controlled substance precursors
knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the controlled
substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful
manufacture of any controlled substance.

U.C.A. 58-37c-10(k) (1953, as amended). Both crimes require the element of possessing a
controlled substance with the intent of using the controlled substance precursor to illegally produce
a controlled substance. The second prong of the Baker test is the determination whether a rational
17

basis existed that would allow the jury to acquit the Defendant of the offense charged while finding
him guilty of the lesser included offense. Such a rational scenario existed in the instant case,
therefore, the lesser included offense instruction should have been given.
Addressing what constitutes a rational basis on which a jury may rely the Baker court further
said:
One of the foundational principles in regard to the submission of
issues to juries is that where the parties so request they are entitled
to have instructions given upon their theory of the case; and this
includes on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence
would support such a verdict
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 154 (Utah 1983). Utah statutory law also states that unless a
rational basis for conviction of a lesser included offense exists a trial judge need not give a lesser
included instruction to the jury. U.C. A. 76-1-402(4) (1953, as amended).
[T]he court is obligated to instruct on the lesser offense only if the
evidence offered provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense." This standard does not require the court to
weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reservedfor the
trier of fact. The court must only decide whether there is a
sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the
question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all
jury instructions in any trial. When the elements of two offenses
overlap as discussed in the previous paragraph, if there is a
sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a
lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the
lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and
therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must
give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the
defendant. This situation will often arise when the critical question
is either the credibility of certain evidence or the determination of
what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of the
evidence. By assessing the evidence and deciding whether any
interpretation of it would, if believed by the jury, permit conviction
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of the lesser offense and acquittal of the greater, the court preserves
the weighing of evidence for the jury but is still able to protect the
weighing process from frivolous "red herrings."
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amount that would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. However, because of the
judge's erroneous belief, we do not know how he would have ruled if he would have had the
correct statutory figure in mind. Therefore, because of the Court's error, a new trial should be
held in order to properly rule on the issue with the correct legal standards being applied.
Second, the judge improperly discounted the importance of the Defendant's own
testimony in conjunction with his possession of crystalline iodine. It appears from the record that
the judge believed that the Defendant's own testimony was not sufficient to support the claim
that he had in fact violated the Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor statute.
The trial judge stated that Defendant's testimony as to possession of the crystalline iodine "was
independent and separate from any of the supporting testimony whatsoever. The only logical
inference that the court can have regarding the source of iodine crystals for these parties is the
reduction by evaporation of tincture of iodine purchased from Overson's Farm Supply and from
Intermountain Farmers." Tr. at 915.
While the Defendant may have been the only witness to testify as to the weight of the
crystalline iodine in the plastic bag, his testimony is still relevant and just as competent as any
other witness'. Further, it is irrelevant what the source of the crystalline iodine was; whether it
originated from the iodine allegedly purchased from Overson's Farm Supply or Intermountain
Farmers it not the issue. In order to find the Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense the
Defendant would have to (1) obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any controlled substance
precursor, and (2) know or have reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance
precursor was intended to be used in the unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance, and
(3) the Defendant would had to have possessed the controlled substance precursor between the
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dates of January 1 1, 1999 and January 21, 1999 I he origin of the methamphetaniine •— • >
consequence,

Bj his o"\;\ lit. testimon> , tl le Defendant did, in fact, possess the bag of crystalline iodine; he
also testified to lib weight n\\ o pounds), which satisfied the minimum weight of two ounces
under the statute (Tv A 7lO» I nis satisfies the first element of the offense.
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could belies e that the I )eteiulant himself wa^ (he individual w ho intended to use the erxstalhne
iodine for the production of a controlled substance. I he second element o\ UK ;esser inclu*;..
offense is satisfied.
The third element, important for the purposes of the trial, was that the offense took: place

testified that he possessed the methamphetamine on Januuiy 1:-, HW (l'i. at 789).

Next, the jury's own verdict suggests that the jury actually believed that the Defendant
possessed controlled substance precursors. The jury, in addressing the enhancements did in fact
find the Defendant guilty of actually operating a clandestine laboratory for the production of
methamphetamine base. The purpose of the law against the possession of controlled substance
precursors is undoubtedly to stem the production of controlled substances. The threshold
amounts indicated in the statutes for various precursors evidently indicate minimum levels for
the production of methamphetamine. It is only logical that if the Defendant actually operated the
lab in order to produce methamphetamine that he would have had to have possessed controlled
substance precursors in at least the minimum threshold amount contemplated by statute. It is
unlikely that the legislature contemplated that possession of a controlled substance precursor was
okay so long as the person with the precursor was only going to make "a little"
methamphetamine. By the jury's very own verdict it is clear that the evidence could have
supported a conviction of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor.
Further, at the time of Defendant's arrest, tincture iodine was not mentioned on the list of
controlled substance precursors found in U.C.A. § 58-37c-3 (1953) (amended 2000). However,
tincture iodine, in concentrations greater than 1.5%, was added to the list in 2000, one year after
the Defendant was arrested. Crystalline iodine, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine were only added
to the list in 1998, one year prior to the Defendant's arrest. Nevertheless, nowhere in the state
does it state that the list of controlled substance precursors is intended to be an exclusive list of
controlled substance precursors and their various forms. Therefore, since tincture iodine is
obviously a controlled substance precursor, having that status laid out in statutory language in
Utah since 2000, the Defendant should have been able to be convicted on Unlawful Possession of
22
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due process and notice concerns falls when applied. Theoretically, an individual could break the
law by possessing a controlled substance precursor not listed in the statute and claim a violation
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a controlled substance and was, in fact, engaged in using the unlisted precursor substance to that
ciul then that person cannot rationally arpu ihat he or she did not have notice that the material

It is also seemingly incongruous with the evident ieui -;.in\ C intent ot nu- stat*.-t-. U) rontrol
the rising tide of illegal methamphetamine production to say that crystalline iodine is illegal, but
tincture iodine, purchased and possessed for the very purpose and intent of producing crystal
iodine, is not illegal Similarly, an individual with a clear design and intent to produce
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I methamphetamine. in doing so

• \ ,:cw j : v remain within the boundaries of the law up uni. J>c time he engages in the
process of extracting the phosphorous from the matchboxes, because matchboxes are not on the
list of precursors. Huvwvu, it is surely not the nature and purpose of the law U protect drug
pi oducers J i 11 J icn u< n v ; c 11 \ H n n u «, ;» i substance preci lrsoi is illegal in \ hatevei form it takes \v hen
the intent to use it to produce methamphetamine is present.

The record is abundant with references to Defendant's connection with and possession of
tincture iodine (Tr. at 62, 529). The jury could easily have convicted the Defendant on the charge
of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor based on the Defendant's alleged
possession of tincture iodine, had the jury been given the choice.
Based on the foregoing and reviewed for correctness, it is evident that the trial judge in
this case erred by not including the jury instruction for a lesser included offense. Therefore, the
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

ISSUE II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL BECAUSE COMMENTS BY TRIAL JUDGE WERE IMPROPER AND
DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN
IMPARTIAL JURY.

In his introductory comments to the jury, the Court stated:
Right now, our system of government, our way of life is under
assault. And it's good people like you who stand up and support it.
Tr. at 54.
Trial Counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied without explanation or
justification. See Tr. at 59-60.

Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is
met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in
its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. For purposes of
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that
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In the instant case the trial judge made the following comment to the jurors after they had
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of impartial jury that our Constitution contemplates.
For this reason the conviction of the Defendant should be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.

ISSUE in
THE PURPORTED METHAMPHETAMINE LAB CENTRAL TO THIS CASE WAS
DISCOVERED IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS I T CAME
A B O U T DUE T O INVALID THIRD-PARTY C O N S E N T .
As stated with more detail in the Statement of I-'aus a bow*. < Mfleer fdwaaN
h :)iiie of I iiii I lasch because of suspected illegal activn> • >:. \\
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See also State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah ! 002'}; Burton v. Zion'sCoop. Mercantile
Inst.249 P.2d 514, 517 (I Jtah 1952); State v. Cram.. 46 |>A1 230 (Utah 2002).
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testified that he asked Mr. Hasch is he could look at the contents inside a car on Mr. Hasch's
property and Mr. Hasch gave consent to the search. According to Officer Edward's testimony, Mr.
Hasch retrieved a key to the car and opened up the car trunk where Officer Edwards testified to
seeing a bag that he suspected contained a methamphetamine lab. Officer Edwards testified that he
believed that the bag and purported methamphetamine lab did not belong to Mr. Hasch because Mr.
Hasch had in fact informed Officer Edwards that it was not his. Mr. Hasch also testified at trial that
the meth lab in the trunk of the car was not his, that he had never used it, and had never seen it
before. Officer Millett testified that when the trunk of the car was opened he saw two suitcases, a
duffel bag, and a backpack. Officer Millet also testified that he believed that Officer Excell
photographed the "stuff in the trunk and then "opened it up briefly just to see what it contained".
Mr. Hasch was the one that gave the consent upon which the officers relied, for the search
of the contents of the trunk, even though Mr. Hasch made clear those items did not belong to him
and belonged instead to the Defendant. See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 There was no assertion that the
Defendant gave consent to the search of his private bags. See id. .passim.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) provides us with the following
discussion of the relevant rules of law:
To address... [this] Fourth Amendment claim, we consider two lines
of search and seizure jurisprudence, one dealing with execution of
search warrants and the other dealing with consent to search. We first
discuss the principles governing these interrelated areas of law, and
then we apply these principles to the facts before us.
The principles governing the execution of a search warrant are
grounded in the purpose for such warrants. As a general rule,
searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and welldefined exceptions. A valid warrant authorizes the police to search
26

w\ :, „ilV4 -,VIK;J :i.c^ otncrw!.^ would have no right, and
co;;>equently, the terms of the warrant dictate the scope of the
officers' authority. A centralpurpose of the requirement of a warrant,
issued under the authority of a neutral magistrate, is to protect
against "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings"
Dunn . / / l ^ r (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Since a warrant \\ as not obtained for the search, ihc officers rely upon the consent of Mr.
I las*.,* U; v. *\ iaie ihv. ..ccv,. *\\ x\ \ as ;a,»t
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I he core jnquiiv tit a I ourtli Amendment a.ij, ,M:> I* wiiu • a
person has a reasonable expectation of pri\ac\ in the area
searched " United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Car.
1985). "It is the right of possession rather than the right of
ownership which ordinarily determines who may consent to a
police search of a particular place." 3 Wayne R, LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 8.5(b) (2d ed. 1987). If a third party rather than the
defendant consents to a search, the third party must he one who
possesses "common authority" over the area or has some other"
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to he
inspected:' Id. § 8.5(c) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974)). The State bears
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the burden of proving common authority, and it must do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177, 178
n.14.
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added).
Defendant's bags are obviously private places or personal effect as contemplated by this
relevant language. This expectation of privacy triggers the warrant requirement. To argue that a
man's luggage is a public place where he has no expectation of privacy in our society would be
laughable and has been rejected by the Court. See State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484; U.S. v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The Defendant obviously had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his own bags.
Because the Defendant did not give consent to the search of his bags, the State must rely
upon the consent of a third party to substitute for his consent. However, in this case, such thirdparty consent was not valid. In any event, the State did not make a showing on the record that
there was sufficient common authority to give rise to valid third-party consent.
The Officers knew that the bag or bags in the trunk did not belong to Mr. Hasch and in
fact did not believe that they belonged to Mr. Hasch. There is no indication of joint-ownership or
control.
At all times Mr. Hasch told investigating officers that the bags were not his. If the officers
believed that the bags did not belong to Mr. Hasch, and at least one officer (Edwards) testified
that he did not believe the bag to be Mr. Hasch's, then the officers could not in good faith assert
that Mr. Hasch exercised common authority over the bags and thereby have the ability to consent
to the search of Defendant's bags. Any consent by Mr. Hasch was ineffective to overcome the
warrant requirement. Based on probable cause the officers could have obtained a warrant to
search the bags, but the officers in this case failed to do so. Therefore, the opening of the bags
without proper consent or a warrant constituted an illegal search and subsequent seizure of
Defendant's bags.
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common authority over It, This is not acceptable under the law.

contravention oi the l-ourth Amendment and subsequent!} used u> eon\ ict the ; j>eteihbni

If the e'"\ idence were si ippressed from a ji n 3 it is possible that the • i.k« 4 ne of the trial may
very well have been different, since the State would not liuv v ;ud arguably its most
important evidence at trial.
Defendant asks that Deft ndant's c
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trial with the evidence from the car suppie^cd.

ii the i iu.r; . uk , ihai tin* M ^ :.v -.iv \»a , ; ; i.ii^iociOo. ..tU. .; ^\as inciiecuve
assisiauee of counsel u> not raise it. in Slate v. templm, oU5 P.id I X2. the court followed
the analysis and decision result in Strickland v. Washington, 466 I S. K'«8 (1984) f M he
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland, the Court set - *; ;> r \ •
part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing the counsel' s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Id. al 68 ;
-Harder I* ii^.c\ ihc in--; pa;; • »! m^ lu>i u Jv.'ienU«i.ii nur-. identity the ue* - w(
onn.^aons which, under the circumstances show that counsel's performance fell belo-objective standard of reasonableness. First, in the instant case, if trial counsel did no
sufficiently raise die third-party consent based ground^ t-.»r suppression, then he onnnitied
a grounds to suppress the most potentially damning evidence n Hie State's possession, die
! *!hjmphetamine lab materials. This omission cannot Minplv he attributed to a !actieai
< t^on and there is sufficient information on the record suggesting that an attempt to
^uppiess was absolutely warranted. By not moving to suppress the evidence found in the
ear on Vli. 1 lasch's property, counsel for Defendant was deficient in his representation.
Second, the Defendant was, in fact, prejudiced by the deficiency. A "fair trial" is not one
.,, vviiicii evidence, especially key evidence, is obtained in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment and subsequently u>ed u> dip. iet the Defendant. If the evidence were
suppressed from a jury it is possible thai the outcome of the trial may very well have been
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ISSUE IV
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED BY THE POLICE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL PROPERTY
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT AT THE PURGATORY JAIL AFTER THE
BOOKING INVENTORY SEARCH WAS COMPLETED, VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE THAT
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A POLICE SEIZURE OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE LOCATED AT THE
POLICE IMPOUND LOT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE DAYS AFTER THE
IMPOUND AND INVENTORY SEARCH.
As stated more fully in the Statement of Facts above, Detective Gower and other
law enforcement officials followed Defendant's vehicle on Interstate 15 and later
observed Ms. Karen Hardy walking with Defendant's car stopped a short distance away
from Ms. Hardy's location. Defendant was identified as the driver of the car and arrested.
Defendant's vehicle was impounded and subsequently inventoried.
In speaking with Ms. Hardy, Detective Gower learned that a "boxed"
methamphetamine lab was being stored on the property of Tim Hasch. Later in the
evening Detective Gower responded to the Hasch residence and, with the assistance of
Mr. Hasch, discovered the boxed lab in the trunk of a car parked on Mr. Hasch's property.
The key to open the trunk was provided by Mr. Hasch, who informed Detective Gower
that Defendant possessed another key to the same trunk.
Detective Gower then returned to the Purgatory Correctional Facility in
Washington County, Utah, to examine the items taken from Defendant when he was
booked into jai. He located a key withing this property that later opened the trunk of the
vehicle containing the boxed lab.
Upon further examination of the trunk, Detective Gower located two suitcases, a

different, since the State would not have had its most important evidence at trial, the lab
itself for which Defendant was convicted.
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duffle bag, and a backpack. After conducting an inventory of the items located within the
suitcases and baes. Detective (lower notice these were itenib consistent with clandestiiie
mamiKiiu.niii! i.*: ;ucu;_:.fik r . .,\i \ hearing held on
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(1996). But the court has repeatedly indicated for discerning readers that improper ulterior
motives will be invalidated police conduct in the context of inventory searches. Where Whren,
id. At 811. The court acknowledged that in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), it stated that
"an inventory search must not be used as a rase for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence;" that in Colorado v. Bertine. there had been "no showing that the police,
who were following standard procedure, acted in bad faith for the sole purpose of investigation":
and that in New York v. Burger. 482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987) the court observed in
upholding the Constitutionality of warrantless administrative inspection, that the search did not
appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of...violation of...penal laws." (Emphasis added)
Significantly, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976),
setting forth the high court's first full articulation of the inventory exception, in approving an
inventory after impoundment of a car left legally parked for an extended period, expressed the
following caveat: "[T]here is no suggestions whatever that this standard procedure, essentially
like that following throughout the county, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive." (Emphasis added).
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held "that the inventory exception to the
warrant requirement 'does not apply when the inventory is merely 'a pretext concealing
an investigatory police motive."" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, at 1138 (Utah 1994)
(quoting State v. Hvgh, 711 P.2d 264, at 268 (Utah 1985) (quoting South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976)).
The facts illustrate that the booking inventory at the jail of Defendant's property
was complete before the task force officer returned to the jail and seized items of
Defendant's personal property. The officer may have had the right to seize the alleged
"cook sheet" because the booking deputy recognized its potential evidentiary value when
she was conducting the inventory. However, once that procedure was completed, a law
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enforcement agent would need a search warrant to seize any other items from Defeniianl "s
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i.i ; g additional indictments against a detainee
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The Cohen court also made the following statement pertinent to the situation in
Defendant's case:
The door on prisoner's rights against unreasonable searches
has not been slammed shut and locked. We take seriously the
Court's statement that no iron curtain separates prisoners from
the Constitution, and that the loss of such rights is occasioned
only by the legitimate needs of institutional security.
Id. at 23.
The emphasis on the need to accommodate individual rights to what is recognized as
legitimate objectives is the dominate theme throughout the Supreme Court's writing on this
subject. From this it is patent that since no wall of steel and stone separates prisoners from the
Constitution, prisoner's rights continue to exist. It is the scope of these rights that it is necessarily
limited by the Board authority prison official must have to ensure institutional security, obviously
the creation of limitation or condition on the exercise of Constitutional rights is essential to
orderly prison administration. Yet, because conditioning the exercise of such rights rests on the
twin-rationale of objective administrators insuring prison security, a limitation imposed on
prisoners' Constitutional rights cannot stand when the objectives the rationale serves are absent,
nor any Federal Courts charged with the duty to protect the right of all citizens fulfill that
obligation merely by paying lip-service to this concept.
In this case it is plain that no institutional need is being served were it a prison official
that initiated the search would not be subject to Constitutional challenge ; regardless of whether
security needs could justify it. But here the search was initiated by the prosecution solely to
obtain information for a superseding indictment. In our view, this kind of warrantless search of a
prisoner's cell fall well outside the rational of the decided cases. Barr retains a Fourth
Amendment right-though much diminished in scope - tangible enough to mount the attack on this
warrantless search.
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Since it is clear from the record that the task force searched and seized the personal
property of Defendant for purelv investigatory purposes, in an unreasonable m a n n e r if! oi me
evidence seized at the jail troin Defendant's personal prop^.
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the trial court. Since it was not, the conviction of Defendant should he reversed and ine east
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Cir. 1986) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of vehicle because owners were
aware of investigation and truck was readily accessible to public streets); U.S. v. Forker, 928
F.2d 365 (11 th Cir. 1991) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of vehicle because
officers were not certain how many sets of keys to the car existed or whether the car would
remain in the parking lot if a warrant was sought and officers had not apprehended all suspects
or other people involved in the conspiracy and the vehicle was vulnerable to efforts of
defendant's cohorts to seize or destroy evidence).
In this case Defendant's vehicle was impounded and in the custody of the police at
a police impound lot and secured. The vehicle was therefore immobilized and possessing
no other threat that would justify a warrantless search some twelve days following the
completion of the impound inventory search.
The impound inventory of Defendant's car was complete on January 21, 1999. On
that day, the legitimate, recognized purpose of an inventory search was completed. No
consent was given to the officers to perform a search of the vehicle. No other exception to
the warrant requirement would apply to an automobile housed in a police impound lot.
Therefore, the law enforcement officers, when they returned on February 2, 1999 to
obtain an item from Defendant's vehicle, should have obtained a warrant to search
Defendant's car and subsequently seize the box from the vehicle. They did not obtain
such a warrant, but simply entered Defendant's vehicle and removed a potentially
incriminating piece of evidence.

In this case it is clear that the vehicle was impounded and in

the custody of the police at a police impound, and therefor immobilized, and posing no threat to
justify a warrantless search some (12) twelve days following the completion of the impound
inventory search. See Lavickv v. Burnett, 758 F. 2d 48, 475 (10th Cir. 1985) (warrantless seizure
and search of Defendant's truck invalid because vehicle immobile due to dismantled engine and
on private property). The police would need a warrant to repeat a search already conducted for a

36

more extensive search, "Investigatory purposes." see U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115-21
(police may repeat search already conducted by private party but must obtain warrant before
conducting more extensive search of container or contents). It is clear the purpose of an inventory
search is to satisfy (3) three purposes, 1) To protect the owner's property while it is in police
custody; 2) To protect the police against claims of lost of stolen property; and 3) To protect the
police from potential danger. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Illinois v.
Lafayette. 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); see
e.g., U.S. v. Ford, 986 F. 2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) (inventory search of car valid to protect against
danger and false claims of loss); U.S. v. Lage, 183 F. 3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) (inventory
search of truck extended to engine compartment invalid). The legitimate purpose of the inventory
search was concluded on January 21, 1999. The record indicated that the second look/search
conducted on February 2, 1999 was clearly for investigatory purposes, obtaining and seizing
evidence to aid in the investigation, and prosecution of the Defendant's which is not a legitimate
purpose of an inventory search, see U.S. v. Marshall 986 F. 2d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1993)
(invalid inventory search of vehicle when officers indicated purpose of search to find evidence of
criminal activity); U.S. v. Johnson, 820 F. 2d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1987) (Invalid inventory search
of sealed envelope in which officers previously placed currency found on defendant at time of
arrest because motivation for search to determine whether currency came from series of bank
robberies); U.S. v. Blaze, 143 F. 3d 585, 592 (10th Cir. 1998) (invalid inventory search of vehicle
because officers admitted to investigatory purpose in stumbled - upon drug deal, failed to follow
set procedures, and failed to catalogue items found in trunk); U.S. v. Khourv. 901 F. 2d 948, 95760 (11th Cir. 1990) (invalid search because inventory exception did not justify second look at
inventoried diary when motivated by investigatory purpose). See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 272-73;
U.S. v. Thompson. 29 F. 3d, 62, 66 (2nd Cir. 1994) (same); U.S. v. Castro: 129 F. 3d 752, 755 (5th
Cir. 1997) (invalid inventory search of vehicle because search was immediately preceded by
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obvious attempt to obtain incrimination evidence of drug dealing); U.S. v. Rodriguez-Morales,
929 F. 2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991) (inventory search valid when caretaking motive not mere
subterfuge for coexisting desire to investigate); U.S. v. Decker, 19 F. 3d 287, 289 (6th Cir. 1994)
(valid inventory search of vehicle when at time vehicle seized officers in possession of valid
search warrant authorizing vehicle search); U.S. v. Franks. 864 F. 2d 992, 1001 (3rd Cir. 1998)
(inventory search valid when non-investigatory motive present in addition to motive to
investigate known fugitive).
Further, the Courts' attention is called to Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632,
(1990) wherein the court clearly sets forth the valid purpose of the automobile impoundinventory exception to the search warrant requirement. Evidence gathering is not one of those
purposes.
For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that this court rule that the
district court should have suppressed the evidence seized by the police authorities under color of
the "book inventory" and the evidence seized from Defendant's automobile on February 2, 1999,
and reverse the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment of the lower court and remand the case
back for a new trial.

ISSUE V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED
UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY.
As described more completely in the Statement of Facts above, the district court failed
to limit Larry J. Overson's identification testimony at trial. At the preliminary hearing on this
matter Mr. Overson identified Defendant as one of the two persons who purchased iodine in
his store on January 14, 1999. However, Mr. Overson's identification of Defendant was not
only assisted by Defendant being seated at the defense counsel's table and attired in prison
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garb, but was also prompted to give his identification by a leading question by the state
prosecutor.
The prosecutor asked Mr. Overson the following question: "Is one of the
individuals that you saw on January 14th in your store seated at the table on my left?"
Therefore, as a result of the prosecutor essentially pointing out Defendant to the witness
for the purposes of identification, Mr. Overson's identification is forever tainted.
(Mr. Overson could also not identify or recall seeing another person (Karen Hardy) who
had earlier been in the court room for the preliminary hearing, and who, in fact, had been
the person who actually purchased the iodine in question directly from Mr. Overson (Tr.
6,11)).
Admitting the tainted eyewitness testimony violated Defendant's right to a fair trail
under the United States and Utah Constitutions. In State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986) Utah courts received guidance on how to evaluate the value of eyewitness
identification with the following list of factors by which reliability of such identification
must be determined:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind
of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether
the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
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Long, 721 P.2d at 493. The District Court failed to issue an order directing the State's
witness, Larry J. Overson not to identify the Defendant as one of the two (2) people that
purchased tincture on Iondine at his store. At the Preliminary Hearing herein, Mr.
Overson identified the Defendant as (1) of the two (2) persons that purchased said Iodine
in his store on January 14, 1999 (Tr. 8-10). At that time the Defendant was seated at
counsel table; next to defense counsel and was attired in prison garb.
For the reasons stated above it was respectfully requested that this Court reverse
and remand with an order that the district court suppress the tainted eyewitness testimony
by Mr. Larry Overson. Given the overly suggestive manner in which the initial
identification occurred, the eye-witness testimony was thereafter inherently unreliable and
it was unfairly prejudicial to the Defense to allow that testimony to be elicited at trial.

ISSUE VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED [N ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A JAIL
"KITE" OR LETTER (TRIAL EXHIBIT #28) WHERE THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO ALLOW THE LETTER INTO EVIDENCE.
At trial the State introduced, with the Defense's objection being overruled, a jail "kite" or
letter purported to have been written by the Defendant, which contained incriminating statements
which the State utilized as evidence that Defendant was attempting to convey to a co-defendant
his encouragement that they stick together and not cut a deal with the State, and suggesting to the
co-defendant that she get the key to the box holding the methamphetamine lab so, purportedly,
evidence could be taken and/or destroyed.
The Defense objected for lack of foundation, and the Court overruled the objection. The
Court stated that the only foundation for the letter was the testimony of a co-defendant who
indicated she could recognize the handwriting as the Defendant's handwriting. See R. 1257, p.
520 (Court states: " . . . It is the identity of this, lay identification of that handwriting as Mr.
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Messer's, which is the sole basis for the court's admission of it.").
There was insufficient foundation to allow the admittance of said letter/kite into evidence.
See Utah Rules of Evidence 104; Utah Rules of Evidence 901. "The requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Utah
Rules of Evidence 901. The only foundation here was the general, non-scientific, lay
identification of the handwriting. Although a lay person can generally identify handwriting with
which the witness is familiar, see State v. Freshwater, 85 P.2d 447 (Utah 1906), here there is a
dearth of other foundational evidence which, coupled with the lay testimony regarding
handwriting identification, should have made the kite inadmissible for lack of foundation. The
letter/kite was not seized from the Defendant or his cell, but in fact from another inmate's person.
There was no testimony by the seizing jailer, or from the inmate from whom the letter/kite was
seized, but only a co-defendant's lay testimony that the handwriting looked like the Defendant's
handwriting. This testimony does not establish the time, place, or other background facts
regarding the letter, and furthermore this handwriting analysis was from a lay witness and her
identification testimony regarding the letter did not flow from her commenting on its comments,
creation, sending or delivery, context, etc., and thus her ability to testimony is essentially that of a
handwriting expert, which she was not (nor did the State purport that she was). Excluding a
letter where there is inadequate foundation is appropriate. See, e.g., Murdoch v. Farrell, 163 P.
1102 (Utah 1917). It could not be established as to where the letter had come from, where it had
been, who had handled it, altered it, etc. Thus, this letter had insufficient foundation and should
have been excluded.
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ISSUE VII
THE COURT ERRED IN DISALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE
WITNESS, MR. PAUL HALSTEAD, ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY, AND THE
TESTIMONY OF MR. TROY THODE ON THE BASIS OF IT BEING TOO
COLLATERAL TO THE ISSUES AT TRIAL.
The Defense sought at trial to have Mr. Paul Halstead, who had been a cell mate of
State's witness, Mr. Ervin Hasch, testify that Ervin Hasch, was attempting to pin the
methamphetamine lab on Mr. Messer rather than having to answer for it himself. The Court did
not allow this testimony based on the determination that it was hearsay and on the fact that the
Defense did not reveal the Defense's intention to put on this hearsay testimony to the State until a
point during the trial. The Court determined it could not come in, due to this lack of notice, and
the Court cited Utah Rules of Evidence 803(24). Id. This testimony, however, directly
undermined evidence obtained from and through Mr. Hasch, which was central to the case, and if
in fact he stated to a fellow inmate that he was trying to pin the methamphetamine charge on the
Defendant rather than himself, is so crucial that the notice requirement should have been relaxed;
the State did not indicate that it was particularly prejudiced in any specific way, but rather sought
simply to rely on the notice requirement as a means to block the critical, defense-friendly
testimony.
Furthermore, the testimony was inconsistent with other statements of Mr. Hasch as
revealed at trial, and was an admission of a co-conspirator and thus not hearsay, pursuant to Rule
801(d)(1) (prior inconsistent statement) and (2) (admission of party-opponent). Certainly
statements amounting to the fact that Mr. Hasch was trying to pin the crime on the Defendant so
as to avoid liability himself, would count as statements inconsistent with his statements that the
Defendant, in truth of fact, committed the acts which constituted the crime in this case. Prior
inconsistent statements are not hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985).
Further, while Mr. Hasch was not a defendant in this trial, he was a co-conspirator in the
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commission of these methamphetamine crimes, and co-conspirator's admissions are admissible.
See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989).
The Defense also sought at trial to put on testimony from bail bondsman Troy Thode
regarding a woman he'd previously bailed out of jail, State's witness Karen Hardy. The
testimony in question, which was not allowed by the Court, was that Ms. Hardy had been bailed
out by him, and had secured the transaction with some jewelry and two vehicles; and that the
vehicles, when the bondsman went to tow them to hold them, were gone; and that the jewelry
turned out to be reportedly stolen from another State's witnesses' (Todd Farnsworth's) house;
and that she had jumped bail. The Court did not allow this testimony, on the basis that it was
"impeachment in a far too collateral issue." While it is true that the evidence which could have
been elicited from Troy Thode did not deal with the exact issues of this trial, it was credible
evidence of dishonesty of an important State witness, and should have been revealed to the jury
so that the jury could evaluate the credibility of that witness. Generally, impeachment testimony
is admissible if it goes to credibility, even though it introduces evidence which would be
otherwise inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991). While specific
acts of misconduct that do not result in criminal convictions are sometimes, or generally,
inadmissible to impeach a witness, see, e.g., State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978), in this
instant the testimony was so compelling and so important because it directly undermined the
credibility of the State's witness, and had to do with specific acts of dishonestly in dealing with
the criminal justice system (treatment of a bondsman and bond-jumping) that it should have been
allowed so that the truth could be known about this witness, and the Defendant allowed a fair
trial.
The denial of the Defendant's opportunity to put on relevant evidence which would
potentially vindicate him by damaging the State's case and raising reasonable doubt strips him of
his constitutional right to a fair trial in which he is able to put on evidence which calls into
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question the State's case and allows him to defend himself.

See Utah Rules of Evidence 608;

Utah Rules of Evidence 804; U.S. Constitution Amend., VI and XIV, as well as the Utah
Constitution Article I, Section 7, and 12. Evidentiary rules should be relaxed to allow evidence
vital to a criminal defendant's defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct.
1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
The Cout's Evidentiary Errors were Not Harmless
Regarding the evidentiary arguments and issues discussed above, the Defendant is
required to show not only error, but that any errors were not harmless. See, e.g., Hall v. NACM
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97,ffl[ 21, 988 P.2d 942. As for issues II, IV and V, these items go
to the discovery of the methamphetamine lab which is the heart of this case. Certainly if error
occurred with respect to these issues, then they cannot be said to have been harmless, for they
allowed the methamphetamine lab itself to come into evidence. As for issues V, the eye witness
testimony was crucial and cannot be said to have been harmless. The lab in question was not
found in the possession of the Defendant, or in Defendant's house or car. Thus eye-witness
testimony linking him t the lab was critical for the success of the prosecution. And, as for issue
VI, the impeachment of crucial State witnesses, particularly the disallowed impeachment of one
witness as to that witness's statement to a fellow inmate that he was trying to pin the charge on
the Defendant, is absolutely critical and cannot be said to be harmless either, since it could have
convinced the jury that the lab belonged to that State's witness (it was found in the trunk of his
car) rather than the Defendant.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should reverse the conviction and remand for
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new trial.
Dated this

'$ day of

f V-S.

2005,
BARNES^fe 4LLEN, LLP

Randall C. Allen
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did cause two copies of this brief to be sent by US mail to:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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ADDENDUM
Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment

HLhD
SCOTT F GARRETT (#8687)
Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435)865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

CJth G:^r-.. -, <' COU?l'i
IRON COUNTY ' j V l y
DEPUTY CLERK.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT
Plaintiff,

vs

TERRY ARNOLD MESSER JR
d o b 03/20/73.

Criminal No

991500647

Judge James L Shumate
Defendant.

The Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., having been convicted by a duly
empaneled jury of his peers of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony, and the jury having also found the following
enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the Defendant did possess said laboratory
equipment or supplies within 500 feet of a residence; (2) that the Defendant did possess said
laboiatory equipment or supplies for the production of methamphetamine or methamphetamine base,
and (3) that the Defendant did illegally possess, transport, or dispose of hazardous or dangerous
materials in furtherance of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation, and said materials
caused a substantial risk to human health or safety, and the jury having found the Defendant guilty.

as well as found the enhancements, beyond a reasonable doubt on October 25, 2001, and the Court
accepted said guilty verdict and thereafter ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation
report and scheduled the matter for sentencing; and on or about November 5, 2001, the Defendant,
by and through his then attorney, Jim Scarth, filed a request to re-schedule the sentencing in the
above-entitled matter, and the Defendant having asserted that he waived his right to a presentence
investigation report, and after having received the Defendant's motion, the Court having called the
matter on for sentencing on December 3, 2001, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named
Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER JR., having appeared before the Court in person, together
with his then attorney of record, James R. Scarth, and the State of Utah having appeared by and
through then Deputy Iron County Attorney Scott F. Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the file
in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy
Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the
following Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, TERRY
ARNOLD MESSER, JR., has been found guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, by a duly empaneled
jury, of the offense of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony. Further, the jury found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the following enhancements, to wit: (1) that the Defendant did possess said laboratory
equipment or supplies within 500 feet of a residence; (2) that the Defendant did possess said
laboratory equipment or supplies for the production of methamphetamine or methamphetamine base;
and (3) that the Defendant did illegally possess, transport, or dispose of hazardous or dangerous
materials in furtherance of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation, and said materials

caused a substantial risk to human health or safety. The Court having asked whether the Defendant
had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause
to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as
charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., and
pursuant to his conviction of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment
in the Utah State Prison for a period of not less than five (5) years and not more than the term of his
natural life.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be given credit for time served to date.
Specifically, the Defendant shall be given credit for time served from January 21. 1999. to
October 21. 2004, for a total of 2,100 days.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER
JR., and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be held under the provisions
of the foregoing Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

/

day of March, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

^1
JAMES L. SHUMATE
District Court Judge
3
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Second
Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Terry Arnold
Messer Jr., Criminal No. 991500647, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this

*(

day of March, 2005.

c

YN8ULLOCH

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
(

S E A L

)

By:.
f/'X'
Deputy District Court Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, by first-class mail,
postage fully prepaid, on this

*~

day of March, 2005, to the following, to wit:

Mr. Glenn C. Halterman
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 1472
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1472

Assistant
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF IRON
) ss
I the undersigned Clerk of the FIFTH DISTRCT COURT, certify that this documen is a w e
copy of the original document on file In the
C

' # m « S 8 ) rW h ^ n d * . « l of the court
—
on thinriftta*.LL~ ^- 'P. v ^ « - —

